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Abstract. Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) has been used as the under-
lying logic to model and reason over Multi-Agent Systems governed by
norms (NorMAS). It is known that SDL is not able to represent contrary-
to-duty (CTD) scenarios in a consistent way. That is the case, for ex-
ample, of the so-called Chisholm paradox, which models a situation in
which a conditional obligation that specifies what must be done when a
primary obligation is violated holds. In SDL, the set of sentences that
represent the Chisholm paradox derives inconsistent sentences. Due to
the autonomy of the software agents of a NorMAS, norms may be vio-
lated and the underlying logic used to model the NorMAS should be able
to represent violation scenarios. The contribution of this paper is three-
fold: (i) we present how Kelsenian thinking, from his jurisprudence in the
context of legal ontologies, and Intuitionist Hybrid Logic can be adopted
in the modeling of NorMAS, (ii) discuss how this approach overcomes
limitations of the SDL and (iii) present a discussion about normative
conflict identification according to Hill’s functional taxonomy, that gen-
eralizes from standard identification by impossibility-of-joint-compliance
test.
Keywords: Normative Multi-Agent Systems; Norms; Contrary-to-duties; CTD
Paradoxes; Kelsenian Jurisprudence; Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic
1 Introduction
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is the traditional logic for reasoning about nor-
mative aspects, such as, obligations, permissions and prohibitions [29]. This logic
has been widely applied to formalize Normative Multi-Agent Systems (NorMAS)
[4], which are Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) that adopt norms as a means to co-
ordinate and restrict the behavior of software agents, aiming at achieving the
overall goal of the system. In NorMAS, norms can be viewed as a regulatory
mechanism that guides software agents, by establishing the desirable/ideal be-
havior of them.
It is known that there are scenarios that only can be represented in SDL by
sets of sentences that derive inconsistent sentences or derive sentences with a
counterintuitive reading [25]. Such scenarios are called contrary-to-duty (CTD)
paradoxes. The CTD paradoxes that are counterintuitive in the common sense
reading are not considered so critical as the CTD paradoxes that derive incon-
sistent sentences [24]. The Chisholm paradox [9] is a scenario that results in an
inconsistent theory when formalized in SDL. This paradox models a situation in
which: (1) there is a primary obligation stating what ought to be done; (2) there
is a compatible-with-duty obligation that says what must be done when the pri-
mary obligation is fulfilled; (3) there is a conditional obligation (also called CTD
obligation) that determines what must be done if the primary obligation is vio-
lated; and (4) there is a factual claim that indicates that the primary obligation
was violated. Note that a CTD obligation is an obligation that is only enforced
when a violation occurs.
The SDL formalization of the Chisholm paradox is the conjunction of the fol-
lowing sentences:
O(p) (1)
O(p⇒ q) (2)
¬p⇒ O(¬q) (3)
¬p (4)
where O is the deontic modality for obligation, p is a propositional variable and
so is q.
SDL has the following axioms and inference rules:
TAUT All the tautologies of classical propositional logic.
K O(p⇒ q)⇒ (O(p)⇒ O(q))
D O(p)⇒ ¬O(¬p)
MP if ⊢ p and ⊢ p⇒ q then ⊢ q
OB-NEC if ⊢ p then ⊢ O(p).
As for the proof of inconsistency, from (2) and K we get O(p)⇒ O(q), and then
from (1) and MP, we get O(q), but by MP alone we get O(¬q) from (3) and
(4). From these two conclusions, by Propositional Calculus, we get O(q)∧O(¬q),
contradicting the SDL principle that obligations cannot conflict [29], formally
⊢ ¬(O(q) ∧O(¬q)), i.e., q cannot be obligatory and forbidden simultaneously.
The impossibility of representing CTD scenarios is a relevant limitation of SDL
since in many applications norms can be violated. This kind of reasoning is
needed in NorMAS because software agents are endowed with autonomy and
sometimes the actual behavior of an agent deviates from the ideal behavior
(according to the norms), i.e., an agent may choose not to comply with the
system’s norms in order to achieve its own goals [4,6]. Then, it is natural to
define CTD obligations in MAS telling what should be done when a norm is
violated. Applications that deal with fault-tolerance, for instance, also need to
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represent CTD scenarios, i.e., once an obligation is violated, a corrective action
must be performed [8].
Another challenge, together with the modeling of CTD scenarios, that must
be taken into account in NorMAS, is that the system must be able to deal
with conflicts among norms. Two norms are in conflict, for instance, when one
obliges an agent to perform an action that is being prohibited by other norm
simultaneously. There is a famous example in the literature illustrating this
situation, where a soldier is obliged to kill but he has a (moral) obligation to not
to kill. When there is a normative conflict, the agent cannot choose to comply
with both norms and whatever the agent does or refrain from doing will lead
to a norm violation [28]. In MAS, considering that an agent can play different
roles, it is common that conflicts of this nature arise between norms associated
with the different roles [10]. (Several techniques to deal with normative conflicts
are nicely summarized in [27].)
In this paper we propose a novel approach to formalize NorMAS that overcomes
limitations of SDL. We represent norms from a Kelsenian perspective with Intu-
itionistic Hybrid Logic (IHL) [3] as underlying logic. The Kelsenian perspective
does not assign truth-values to norms. Rather, they are understood as worlds
(in a Kripke structure) where properties of a MAS hold or not. In Hybrid Logic
terminology, norms are understood as nominals. The second contributions of this
paper is a discussion on how NorMAS with a Kelsenian interpretation of norms,
or Kelsenian NorMAS for short, deal with normative conflicts while considering
Hill’s taxonomy [19].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some
approaches that also do not consider SDL as a suitable way to represent norma-
tive systems. Section 3 presents the concept of norm according to the Kelsenian
Jurisprudence and shows how Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic (IHL) complies with
Kelsenian requirements. In Section 4, we present an example of CTD scenario in
a NorMAS and discuss how it is modeled in our approach. Section 5 describes
how our approach represents normative conflicts taking into account the Hill’s
taxonomy for normative conflicts. Section 6 concludes this paper and presents
directions for future work.
2 Related Work
The approach described in [7] describes a deontic action logic with stratified
norms for designing and reasoning about fault-tolerant systems. When a viola-
tion occurs in these systems, a non-desirable system state is reached and CTD
norms are applied to recover the system. In order to be able to represent CTD
norms, the logic described considers that there are different levels of norms in
the specification, and violations of norms are tolerated only at some levels.
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In [13], the third author and others propose Intuitionistic Description Logic
(iALC), for reasoning about laws. iALC is a notation variant of IHL, designed
to cope with the ontological requirements in [12]. In particular, iALC handles
Commitment III, discussed in Section 3, very nicely as iALC concepts represent
different normative systems (understood as a collection of norms) quite naturally.
However, as opposed to iALC, IHL has support for (action-based) temporal
reasoning. A characteristic that we believe makes it more suitable to model and
reason about NorMAS than iALC.
There is a line of thinking that agrees with the idea a norm should not have a
truth-value, which we adopt in this paper. In [22,16,5], for instance, the authors
advocate that SDL is not a suitable logic for modeling normative systems. In
addition to the impossibility to represent CTD in a consistent way they agree
that it makes no sense to assign norms truth values because norms are non-
descriptive, i.e., obligations and prohibitions (imperative norms) demand and
allow behavior, respectively. They can be applied or not, can be followed or not
and can be evaluated based on other norms (when a norm is judged based on
a moral code, for instance). Some approaches in the literature have proposed
to reconstruct SDL as a logic of normative propositions (e.g. [23,1]) or as a
logic of imperatives (e.g. [14,15]) to cope with this problem, as pointed out
in [5]. We agree with their point of view that norms should not have truth
value. However, we do not follow the proposal of reconstructing SDL. We chose
a different approach, based on Intuitionistic Hybrid Logics (IHL), where norms
are nominals, as discussed in Section 3.
3 Kelsenian Normative Multi-Agent Systems
The Theory of Law, also called Jurisprudence, is interested in to determine the
meaning of the concept of law. Basically there are two views concerning this
concept. The first view states that a law is a fact that can be perceived by our
senses. It is an object of natural sciences, such as, physics and chemistry. The
second view states that a law is a norm, i.e., it is a rule that establishes what
ought to be done. The Pure Theory of Law adopts the view that the law is a
norm [20].
Kelsenian Jurisprudence [21], in a nutshell, advocates that “the law”, in legal
terms, or the norms in a NorMAS, is a set of individual regulatory statements,
each of them created to enforce a positively desired behavior in the system.
In [12], the authors propose the following requirements (or ontological commit-
ments) from an analysis of Kelsenian Jurisprudence. Table 1 interprets the three
ontological commitments in [12] in the context of NorMAS. Henceforth, we will
refer to the contents of Table 1 as Kelsenian regulation. 3
3 In this paper, we discuss Commitments (I) and (II) only, without loosing consis-
tency of presentation. Commitment (III) requires a broaden presentation on the
interconnections of normative systems.
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(I) Individuals are norms;
(II) There is a transitive and reflexive relationship between individuals and norms
that reflects a precedence relationship between norms;
(III) There are normative connections between individual norms in different norma-
tive systems or between different agent organizations in the same normative
system.
Table 1. Kelsenian regulation
Ontological commitment (I) is fulfilled by the choice of Hybrid Logic [26,2] (an
extension to Modal Logics that adds a new sort of propositional symbols which
are true at exactly one possible world), and the representation of norms as nom-
inals. In Hybrid Logics, there is a new kind of operator, called satisfaction oper-
ator @a. It allows for the declaration of satisfaction statements a : ϕ (sometimes
written @aϕ), denoting that the formula ϕ is true at the point to which the
nominal a refers to. More formally, the nominal a represents a possible world in
the Kripke semantics of IHL.
Before justifying the need for intuitionism, let us first recall the models of Clas-
sical Hybrid Logic. They are Kripke structures
(W,R, V )
where W is a non-empty set of worlds, R is a world accessibility relation R ⊆
W ×W and V :W ×AP → {0, 1}, where AP is the set of atomic propositions,
together with a function g, called an assignment, that, to each nominal, assigns
an element of W . An assignment g′ is an a-variant of g if g′ agrees with g on
all nominals save possibly a. The relation M, g,w |= ϕ is defined by structural
induction in the language of the Classical Hybrid Logic, where M is a model,
g is an assignment, w is an element of W , and ϕ is a formula. The satisfaction
relation for Classical Hybrid Logics is as follows:
M, g,w |= p⇔ V (w, p) = 1,
M, g, w |= a⇔ w = g(a),
M, g, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, g,w |= ϕ and M, g,w |= ψ,
M, g, w |= ϕ⇒ ψ ⇔M, g,w |= ϕ implies M, g,w |= ψ,
M, g, w |= ¬ϕ⇔M, g,w 6|= ϕ,
M, g, w |= ϕ⇔for any element v of W such that wRv, it is
the case that M, g, v |= ϕ,
M, g, w |= a : ϕ⇔M, g, g(a) |= ϕ.
From the perspective of Kelsenian regulation, Classical Hybrid Logic is not
enough because commitment (II) requires a pre-order among norms. Ordering
is a natural way to prevent norm conflicts [27] as it imposes a precedence be-
tween norms. Classical Hybrid Logic, however, does not offer it, as opposed to
Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic.
5
Formulas of Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic are the same as those of Classical Hybrid
Logic. However, connectives ∨ and ♦ are primitive as they are not intuitionisti-
cally definable in terms of the other connectives, contrary to the classical case.
A model for Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic is a tuple
(W,≤, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W )
where W is a non-empty set partially ordered by ≤, for each w, Dw is a non-
empty set such that w ≤ v implies Dw ⊆ Dv, for each w, ∼w is an equivalence
relation on Dw such that w ≤ v implies ∼w⊆∼v, for each w, Rw is a binary
relation on Dw such that w ≤ v implies Rw ⊆ Rv, and for each w, Vw is a
function that to each ordinary propositional symbol p assigns a subset of Dw
such that w ≤ v implies Vw(p) ⊆ Vv(p).
W represents the set of states of knowledge and for each state w ∈ W , Dw
denotes the set of possible worlds that are known in such a state. Vw(p) denotes
the set of worlds in which the proposition p is known to be true.
Given a model
M = (W,≤, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W )
and an element w ∈ W , a w-assignment is a function g that to each nominal
assigns an element of Dw. Note that if g is a w-assignment and w ≤ v, then g
is also a v-assignment (this is used in the clauses below for implication and the
 operator). The relation M, g,w, d |= ϕ is defined by induction, where w is an
element of W , g is a w-assignment, d is an element of Dw, and ϕ is a formula.
M, g,w, d |= p⇔ d ∈ Vw(p),
M, g, w, d |= a⇔ d ∼w g(a),
M, g, w, d |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, g,w, d |= ϕ and M, g,w, d |= ψ,
M, g, w, d |= ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔M, g,w, d |= ϕ or M, g,w, d |= ψ,
M, g, w, d |= ϕ⇒ ψ ⇔ for all v ≥ w,M, g, v, d |= ϕ implies
M, g, v, d |= ψ,
M, g, w, d |= ⊥ ⇔ falsum
M, g,w, d |= ϕ⇔ for any element v ≥ w,for all e ∈ Dv,
dRve implies M, g, v, e |= ϕ,
M, g, w, d |= ♦ϕ⇔ for some e ∈ Dw, dRwe and M, g,w, e |= ϕ,
M, g, w, d |= a : ϕ⇔M, g,w, g(a) |= ϕ.
We now define Kelsenian NorMAS in terms of an IHL model. (See Def. 1.)
Following Kelsen, for each norm we have a world w ∈ W in the IHL model. In
other words, the pair (W,≤) captures the normative part of the NorMAS. The
MAS description is represented by the tuple (D,RAct,A) of the IHL model, where
D denotes the set of the states of MAS and RAct,A its (action-labeled) transition
relation, for actions in Act , defined as the disjoint union of the relations for each
agent in A. (In this paper we consider relation ∼, in the IHL model, to be empty,
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without loss of generality, that is, there is no equivalence among states of the
MAS.)
Definition 1 (Kelsenian NorMAS). A Kelsenian Normative Multi-Agent
System is an IHL model:
K = (N,≤, D, ∅, {RAct,An }n∈N , V )
where Act is a finite set of actions; and A is a finite set of agents, such that, for
all n ∈ N , RAct,An =
⋃|A|
i=1 Ri, with Ri ⊆ D×Act ×D and V : D×AP → {0, 1}
with AP the set of atomic propositions.
A state ni ∈ N is such that norm ni is upheld. Note that upheld does not mean
“the norm holds” as norms have no truth value. It means that Ri complies with
ni, behaving accordingly to ni.
4 Kelsenian NorMAS for a CTD scenario
When we consider Normative MAS (NorMAS), scenarios where a norm regulated
MAS may misbehave must be accounted for in a proper logical formalization.
An example of misbehavior is when negative transitions are specified, assuming
a labeled state-transition system formalization of MAS, and a conflict arises
between MAS behavior and its regulation. In this section, we present an example
that illustrates a situation in which an agent of a NorMAS chooses not to comply
with a norm and there is a CTD norm saying what should be done if it occurs.
We will consider in this example the Contract Net [11] agent interaction protocol,
standardized by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA).
Informally, the Contract Net protocol specifies that: (i) when an (initiator) agent
realizes it has a problem to solve, (ii) it may announce it to other agents, (iii)
which in turn will bid for the task of solving (part) of the given problem, (iv)
being then notified by the initiator which was the awarded agent, that then (v)
expedites solving the problem. Figure 1 illustrates the protocol.
Let us consider now a subclass of Contract Net implementations regulated by
the norms in Table 2.
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I P1
P2
. . .
Pm
recognizes
announce
announce
announce
bid
bid
bid
award(P1)
award(P1)
award(P1)
recognizes
Fig. 1. An instance of the Contract Net protocol
Norm# Norm description
n1. “Once a problem is announced then all agents must
bid.”
n2. “Once a problem is announced, all agents must bid
and then an agent must be awarded.”
n3. “If it is not the case that a problem was announced
and agents bade for it then there must not be an
awarded agent.”
Table 2. A regulated Contract Net
Now, if in an implementation of Contract Net with norms from Table 2, say an
electronic commerce system, an agent refuses to perform action bid, it would give
rise to a misbehaving NorMAS, as action bid, at the same time, must and does
not occur. This scenario is depicted in Figure 2 where P3 is the misbehaving
agent that does not implement action bid, with the interrupted or negative tran-
sition (loosely dashed, with double tip and a ray symbol denoting interruption)
denoting that the agent did not perform action bid.
What we have just described is an example of the CTD scenarios that become
paradoxical when Deontic Logic is chosen as the underlying logic to model and
reason on NorMAS. More precisely, to see that the misbehaved Contract Net
implementation in Figure 2 is an instance of the so-called Chisholm paradox
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IP3 P1
P2
. . .
Pm
bid
announce
announce
announce
announce
bid
bid
bid
bid
award(P1)
award(P1)
award(P1)
Fig. 2. A misbehaving Contract Net implementation
(see Section 1) we just need to replace the proposition p from the Chisholm
paradox for “Once a problem is announced then all agents bid”, and proposition
q for “an agent is awarded”. When action bid is not performed by an agent, thus
leading to the negative transition in Figure 2, “all agents must bid” becomes
false and so does p.
Example 1 (Kelsenian NorMAS for the misbehaving Contract Net). The Kelse-
nian NorMAS for the Contract Net instance in Figure 2 is the tuple
K = (N,≤, D, ∅, {RAct,An }n∈N , V )
where N = {n1, n2, n3, n1 ⊓ n2, n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3}, where operation ⊓ denotes the
meet operation of IHL’s underlying Heyting algebra [18]. (Kripke models for
Intuitionistic Logics are Heyting algebras, and therefore lattices.) A state ni is
such that norm ni is upheld. The ordering ≤ is as pictured in Figure 3, D =
{Recognized ,Announced ,Bade,Awarded}, relationR is pictured in Figure 2, A =
{I, P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, Act = {recognize, announce, bid , award}, and V = ∅. Let p
denote “Once a problem is announced then all agents bid”.
Figure 3 pictures an IHL model for a NorMAS that is an instance of the Chisholm
paradox. In this model each norm is represented by a nominal (world), then
n1 |= ⊤ and n2 |= ⊤ indicate the existence of norms n1 and n2 in the NorMAS.
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The meet of these two worlds n1 ⊓ n2 |= ⊤ is a world in which it is obligatory
to comply with n1 and with n2. The nominal n3 is the world in which ¬p holds
(and then proposition p does not hold), that is, it represents a case where the
agency does not comply with the first norm of Table 2.4
The least element of (N,≤) is n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3, that is, the meet of n1, n2 and n3
denoting a world which is not a model for “Once a problem is announced then
all agents bid” since it is ensured that ¬p holds.
n1 |= ⊤ n2 |= ⊤
n1 ⊓ n2 |= ⊤ n3 |= ¬p
n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3 6|= p
≤
≤
≤ ≤
Fig. 3. A Kelsenian NorMAS for a normative contradiction
5 Hill’s taxonomy and Kelsenian NorMAS
In [19] H. Hamner Hill proposes a taxonomy for normative conflict, an important
reference in the normative systems literature in the context of norm conflict
identification and resolution [27]. Hill argues, developing ideas by Kelsen and
others, that normative conflicts identified by impossibility-of-joint-compliance
test, when it is impossible for a norm subject to comply with both of a pair of
norms, is too restrictive. Let us briefly recall why.
The impossibility-of-joint-compliance test can only be applied to norms that one
can construct obedience statements for, that is, a statement that certifies com-
pliance of a norm subject with a given norm. For example, let us consider norm
n1 from Table 2 from Section 4, that says “Once a problem is announced then
all agents must bid”. Its obedience statement would be “A problem has been an-
nounced and all agents bade”. Therefore, impossibility-of-joint-compliance test
4 Note that not being a model for p and ¬p holding in a state are different things. In
the former case state n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3 is not a model for p while in the latter case state
n3 is a model for ¬p, that is, ¬p is satisfiable.
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only applies to deontic imperatives, i.e., it cannot detect conflicts involving per-
missions.
There are, however, scenarios where: (i) deontic permissions conflict with deontic
permissions, (ii) there are regulatory modalities other than the deontic modali-
ties, as in power-conferring norms [17], and (iii) conflicts considering non-deontic
norms.
Quoting Hill [19, pg. 238 and 239]:
For Kelsen, a normative conflict is a clash of forces, forces which operate
in different directions in a single point. (. . .) The generic phenomenon of
normative conflict occurs when norms interact in ways that the function
of one or more of the norms involved is thwarted.
In order to be able to detect conflicts involving permissions, Hill replaced the
concept of obedience by the concept of conformity. For each norm that indicates
permission, there are two conformity statements, as follows: (i) the first confor-
mity statement indicates that the agent chose to do what is being allowed by the
permission; and (ii) the second conformity statement indicates that the agent
chose not to do what is being allowed by the permission. Then, considering a
scenario in which there is a prohibition stating that a cannot be done and there
is a permission stating that a can be done. In this example, there is a conflict
between the prohibition and the first conformity statement of the permission.
Hill defines a functional taxonomy of normative conflicts: (i) normative con-
tradiction, (ii) normative collision, and (iii) normative competition. Normative
contradictions are “a purely deontic phenomena” where only deontic norms may
contradict each another. In normative collisions, deontic imperatives and de-
ontic permissions collide, mixtures of deontic and non-deontic norms collide or
only non-deontic norms collide. Normative competition regards norm conflicts
from distinct normative systems. In what follows, we discuss about Kelsenian
NorMAS for normative contradictions and normative collisions between deontic
imperatives and deontic permissions. In this paper we do not consider norma-
tive competitions since we are only interested in dealing with conflicts in one
NorMAS.
Normative contradiction. Normative contradictions are conflicts that can be
detected by the impossibility-of-joint-compliance test. They come from scenar-
ios where the norm subject finds oneself faced with duties one cannot fulfil.
Normative contradictions violate the principle of consistency of SDL that says:
O(a)⇒ ¬O(¬a). This kind of conflict usually occurs between norms imposed by
different authorities. In SDL, normative contradiction is a conflict in the form:
O(a) ∧O(¬a)
Note that, the so-called contrary-to-duty paradoxes, when SDL is used to for-
malize them, result in this kind of conflict. One such contrary-to-duty paradox
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is Chisholm paradox which is embodied in the “misbehaved” Contract Net im-
plementation in Figure 2. When formalized in Deontic Logic, it gives rise to an
inconsistent theory. An example of Kelsenian NorMAS model for a normative
contradiction is illustrated in Figure 3.
Normative collision. Normative collisions are conflicts that do not involve logic
inconsistency but involve functional incompatibility. In SDL, they are conflicts
in the form:
O(¬a) ∧ P (a)
or similarly,
O(a) ∧ P (¬a)
where P denotes the deontic modality for permission.
Following the same approach for deontic imperatives, in our approach deontic
permissions do not have truth value: there are nominal states denoting when the
agency avails itself of a permission and otherwise.
We can illustrate this situation by considering Contract Net instance from Fig-
ure 1, the norms from Table 2, and a permission prescribing that “An agent is
allowed not to bid”. Note that this normative system is slightly different from the
“misbehaving” Contract Net instance in Figure 2. There, the negative transition
is part of the description of the system (the behavior of the system) and here
the permission not to act is at the prescription (what it should do) level. There
is clearly a normative collision here between norm n1 and the given permission,
if the agent choose to do what is being permitted (not to bid). Figure 3 pictures
the IHL model for the normative collision example where world ni denotes norm
ni, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, n4 denotes the state where the agency avails itself of the
given permission and n4 otherwise. The resulting Kelsenian NorMAS is a lattice
with combinations of ni, n4, and n4, as depicted in Figure 4. (All arrows denote
relation ≤.)
The infimum of the lattice is n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3 ⊓ n4 ⊓ n4 |= ⊥ denoting a state of the
Kelsenian NorMAS where no property holds since a join between states n4 and
n4 results in a state where agents chose not to bid and chose to bid making it
impossible to uphold norms n1 to n3. In particular, either norm n1 or n2 can
not be upheld when agents choose not to bid (n4) as they must when a problem
is announced. (A similar argument is used to justify state n3 ⊓n4 |= ⊥.) On the
other hand, when either n1 or n2 can be upheld in a state when agents may bid
and therefore (n1⊔n2)⊓n4 |= ⊤. Norms are upheld in states where single norms
alone are upheld (not a join or meet of worlds) or a permission is upheld, such as
n1 or n4. The join of all the worlds (not to be confused with their conjunction)
represents the supremum of the lattice.
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n1 ⊔ n2 ⊔ n3 ⊔ n4 ⊔ n4 |= ⊤
n3 |= ⊤ n4 |= ⊤n2 |= ⊤n1 |= ⊤ n4 |= ⊤
n2 ⊓ n3 |= ⊤n1 ⊓ n2 |= ⊤ n1 ⊓ n3 |= ⊤
n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3 |= ⊤
n3 ⊓ p |= ⊤ (n1 ⊔ n2) ⊓ n4 |= ⊤
(n1 ⊔ n2) ⊓ n4 |= ⊥ n3 ⊓ n4 |= ⊥
n1 ⊓ n2 ⊓ n3 ⊓ n4 ⊓ n4 |= ⊥
Fig. 4. A Kelsenian NorMAS for a normative collision
6 Conclusion
Regulatory mechanisms are required in order to deal with the autonomy and
(possible) heterogeneity of software agents that compose a Multi-Agent System
(MAS). Norms can be applied in such systems as way of coordination. They are
social constraints that establish explicitly, for instance, which actions a software
agent is permitted, prohibited or obliged to perform.
Standard techniques for modeling and reasoning on Normative Multi-Agent Sys-
tems (NorMAS) fall prey of the interpretation that norms are formulas. When
Deontic Logic is chosen as underlying formalism for NorMAS, CTD scenarios
cannot be represented because its SDL formalization is inconsistent. This is a
relevant problem in NorMas, where autonomous software agents should be able
to violate norms. In order to cope with this problem, the approach presented in
this paper adopts Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic as underlying logic, meeting the
commitments of Kelsenian Jurisprudence.
An important issue in systems regulated by multiple norms, is the possibility
of conflicts among norms. We discuss the possible kinds of conflicts, according
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to the Hill’s taxonomy, that may arise in a system governed by multiple norms
and show how the approach presented allows us to construct models for conflicts
involving deontic imperatives and deontic permissions in an elegant and simple
way. In order to exemplify our IHL model, we use a Contract Net scenario that
is a FIPA protocol for multi-agent communication.
Future work includes further developing our framework, in particular regarding
the normative connections from Commitment III possibly in the directions of
iALC where relations between concepts denote classes of norms. Another direc-
tion is the automation of our approach to simulate and (bound) model check
Kelsenian NorMAS where the model is the semantics of a description in an
appropriate specification language.
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